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The headline numbers appear to show that even as banks and financial intermediaries suffered large
credit losses in the financial crisis of 2007-09, they raised substantial amounts of new capital, both
from private investors and through government-funded capital injections. However, on closer inspection
the composition of bank capital shifted radically from one based on common equity to that based on
debt-like hybrid claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt. The erosion of common equity
was exacerbated by large scale payments of dividends, in spite of widely anticipated credit losses.
Dividend payments represent a transfer from creditors (and potentially taxpayers) to equity holders
in violation of the priority of debt over equity. The dwindling pool of common equity in the banking
system may have been one reason for the continued reluctance by banks to lend over this period. We
draw conclusions on how capital regulation may be reformed in light of our findings.
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Financial intermediaries were at the center of the financial crisis that began in August 
2007.  They bore the lion’s share of the credit losses from securitized subprime 
mortgages, even though securitization was intended to parcel out and disperse credit risk 
to investors who were better able to absorb losses.
3  The capacity to lend suffered as 
intermediaries attempted to curtail their exposure to a level that could more comfortably 
be supported by their capital.
4
 
   
The accumulated losses in the crisis were large, but so were the headline figures for the 
amount of new capital raised.  Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate this “catching up” of capital 
with losses incurred (all figures and tables are gathered together at the end of the paper).   
 
The cumulative acknowledged credit losses for financial institutions worldwide since the 
beginning of the financial crisis in August 2007 to the end of 2009 were $1.73 trillion.  
Set against this, the headline figure for new capital raised was $1.45 trillion.  On the 
surface, the new capital raised is substantial, almost matching the losses.  We see from 
Table 1 that there are some regional variations, with new capital raised in Europe being 
smaller relative to losses when compared to the United States.  Although a substantial 
amount of new capital raised worldwide was in the final quarter of 2008 as part of 
government-funded recapitalization of the banking sector, the raw numbers seem 
impressive. 
 
However, a closer look at the numbers reveals a much less sanguine picture of the 
recapitalization by the banking sector.  We highlight three features in particular that are 
worthy of closer scrutiny.  
 
First, the composition of bank capital has changed, with most of the new capital being 
raised in the form of debt or hybrid claims such as preferred equity.  When leverage is 
measured as the ratio of total assets to common equity, the leverage of the banking sector 
in the US and Europe rose relentlessly during the crisis, as we will show below.  We 
argue that the continued reluctance of banks to lend may be attributable (at least in part) 
to the high leverage of the banking sector. 
 
Second, even as the banking system suffered the depletion of common equity through 
losses on the asset portfolio, banks continued to pay dividends throughout the crisis.  As 
we will show, the outflow of common equity in the form of dividends was substantial in 
                                                 
 
3 In some cases, this appears to have been by design, e.g., in structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, where banks sold guarantees to securitization vehicles to 
game capital requirements.  See Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009) for detailed evidence of such 
“securitization without risk transfer”.  In other cases, it appears to have been a highly levered bet on the 
economy, e.g., as manifested in the holdings of AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities which banks held 
up to 39% of all such securities (Lehman Brothers Report, April 2008).  
4 Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) document that during the crisis, especially in the aftermath of Lehman’s 
collapse, banks have made very few new loans and primarily honored drawdown on pre-arranged lines of 
credit.   
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relation to total assets and total credit losses.  This outflow deprived the banking system 
of much-needed common equity capital precisely when it was most needed.  This erosion 
of common equity through dividends points to the breakdown of the priority of debt over 
equity.  Banks that ultimately received public funding support and were in serious risk of 
failure continued to pay out dividends right from the period leading up to the crisis until 
the period after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.  For a bank whose losses can be 
anticipated, it can be argued that dividends were paid to equity holders at the expense of 
the debt holders (including the taxpayers who fund bailouts).  This represents a straight 
transfer in violation of the priority of debt over equity, which is sustained because of the 
slow-moving nature of the deterioration of book equity.  In effect, the inertia in bank 
accounting makes even a distressed bank appear healthy in terms of its book capital 
ratios, enabling a transfer in violation of priority of debt over equity.  The undesirable 
nature of dividend payments during crises has been commented on by Scharfstein and 




Third, but not least, as common equity is paid out on the liabilities side of the balance 
sheet, the assets that get depleted on the asset side are the safe marketable assets – 
especially cash or government bond holdings.  What gets left behind are the illiquid, 
riskier assets.  This implies a type of risk-shifting or asset substitution that further favors 
the equity holders over the debt holders for the usual reason that equity holders’ claims 
are convex claims over the asset payoffs, while debt holders have concave payoffs.  
Whereas traditionally risk-shifting has been discussed mainly in the context of new 
investments (as in the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we can see that risk-
shifting can also be accomplished through changes in the capital structure of the bank.  
Paying out dividends in cash leaves behind riskier assets on a thinner equity cushion, 
which benefits the shareholders once again, at the expense of the debt holders. 
 
On a related point, since many of the equity holders are also employees of the bank, the 
diversion of funds from debt holders (including taxpayers) to equity holders is related to 
the thorny and politically charged issue of employee compensation in banks.  In this 
sense, our paper can be seen as a contribution pointing out how the determination of bank 
capital structure and dividend policy can be seen as a part of the larger debate on 
compensation issues.  The standard view on corporate governance that emphasizes 
shareholder value maximization may have unintended and adverse consequences for 
failing banks. 
 
Our paper is primarily a descriptive study documenting in a comprehensive way the time 
profile of losses and amount and type of new capital raised by banks in recent years, and 
especially since the beginning of the current financial crisis.  Although our study is by 
design a “fact-finding” study, we believe that it contributes on two fronts.  First, the facts 
                                                 
 
5 The undesirable nature of dividend payments during crises has been commented on by Scharfstein and 
Stein.  See Scharfstein, David S. and Jeremy C. Stein (2008) This Bailout Doesn’t Pay Dividends, The New 






themselves are striking, and we have attempted to present the evidence in a unified way 
that conveys the big picture.  More importantly, the facts uncovered can help to inform 
the way that banks took decisions in the current crisis, and thereby the future reform of 
the rules governing bank regulation.  
 
In particular, we believe that the dwindling pool of common equity may be an important 
reason for the reluctance of banks to extend credit in spite of the large-scale injection of 
bailout capital.  Most of the public injections of bank capital in the United States through 
the TARP program took the form of preferred equity rather than common equity (even 
though in some cases, preferred equity is ultimately converted to common equity).  As a 
consequence, banks’ leverage relative to common equity has increased relentlessly.  To 
the extent that the common equity cushion was subject to increasing compression, the 
stake of the controlling equity holders shrunk in accordance.  This has led banks to take 
an extremely conservative attitude toward taking up the slack in intermediation left by the 
collapse of the securitization market as they would rather wait for the fortunes of their 
beleaguered assets and thinly capitalized balance sheets to resurrect themselves than 
extinguish that option for lower risk loans (see also Diamond and Rajan (2009) for a 
related theoretical point). 
 
A speech by Bill Dudley (2009), the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
notes that executives at banks and government-sponsored enterprises told regulators 
“repeatedly over the past 18 months” that “now is not a good time to raise capital”.  He 
goes on to say: 
 
“This desire to postpone capital raising stems in part to the fact that 
bank executives often do not want to dilute existing shareholders, 
which of course include themselves. […] The self-interested thing to do 
is avoid the dilution and hope for a good state of the world.” 
 
The fear of dilution leads incumbent shareholders to under-invest in raising new common 
equity capital, an agency problem that is a variant of the Myers (1977) debt overhang 
problem (again, not in the context of new investments).
6
 
  This juxtaposition of agency 
problems at failing banks – underinvestment in issuance of new capital and erosion of 
existing capital through dividend distributions – poses some of the most difficult 
questions for bank resolution policy.   
This divergence in the interests of the incumbent controlling shareholders from the 
broader public interest also raises questions on what should be the proper notion of 
regulatory capital.  Under the current system of bank regulation, capital is regarded as a 
buffer against loss for senior creditors, and especially retail depositors.  Hence, under the 
current system, regulatory capital includes subordinated debt and preferred equity.  The 
recent crisis has led to a serious re-think on whether such hybrid claims should qualify as 
                                                 
 
6 Some others, see for example Tucker (2008), argue that the reluctance may be due to banks wanting to 
avoid sending an adverse signal to markets and suffering dilution due to lemon’s premium (as in the Myers 
and Majluf, 1984, model of costly equity issuance).   
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part of regulatory capital.  Indeed, the recently agreed Basel III rules on capital put a 
much greater emphasis on common equity.  In future, regulators may have no choice but 
to employ intervention thresholds that are tied to market value of equity – since that is 
what affects decisions of bank management – and market-imposed leverage constraints 
such as the extent of repo haircuts faced by a financial institution in the market for 
borrowing. 
 
Before we discuss these policy implications, we provide descriptive evidence on capital 
raised by 23 large banks in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe, and 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government sponsored enterprises in the United 
States, focusing especially on the type of capital issued, and on the dividend policies and 
capital structure of these banks, in the period 2000-2009
6
 
.   
 
Evidence on Bank Capital and Dividends 
 
Table 2a shows the total capital raised by each bank/GSE in the pre-crisis period of 2000 
to 2006 by the type of capital – common equity, preferred equity or debt.  For the period 
preceding the crisis, a total of $1.39 trillion of capital was issued by the 25 large financial 
firms in our sample.  A staggering $1.41 trillion of the total capital issued – that is, 
101.2% - was in fact raised in the form of debt.  Preferred equity accounted for $46.3 
billion (3.34%).  Capital outflow to common shareholders was at $63 billion (4.54% of 
capital).  Thus, essentially during the period 2000-2006 these financial firms raised 
capital in the form of debt and to a lesser extent preferred equity. 
 
During the crisis period of 2007-2009  the large financial firms raised nearly $707.6 
billion of capital.  The proportion raised as debt was 29.1% of total capital and accounted 
for $205.8 billion of the total.  Common equity share at $238.1 billion accounted for 
33.7% of capital.  In contrast to pre-crisis trends, more than 36.8% ($309.9 billion) of 
capital was issued in the form of preferred debt.  During this period, the 25 large financial 
firms of the US, the UK and Europe, had negative common equity issuance – that is, 
more of share buyback than share issuance – of $4.02 billion.  This pattern is remarkable 
since this was a period over which bank balance sheets grew significantly, so it must be 
that as documented by Adrian and Shin (2008), this growth was funded close to one for 
one by a combination of debt and preferred equity.  
 
Figure 2a plots this division of capital issued into security type for individual banks for 
the period preceding the crisis from 2000 to 2007.  There are some differences that stand 
out.  While JP Morgan, the relatively better performer during the crisis, issued debt in 
quantity that was 6.12 times common equity issued, in case of Lehman Brothers this ratio 
was 72.17.  Similarly, Citigroup had a high debt to equity ratio of 21.59.  Of note 
Wachovia, Wells Fargo, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, 
                                                 
 
6 Complete details are provided in the Appendix. Appendices A and B describe the variables we employ 
and their sources and the frequency of their measurement. Appendix C lists for each of the 21 banks the 
exact nature of each individual capital issuance from 2007 - 2009.  
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had negative debt to equity ratios representing a capital 
outflow to common equity holders.  HBOS, one of the beleaguered UK bank during the 
crisis, had a debt to common equity ratio of 10.17.  Even with the benefit of hindsight, 
the relationship between type of capital issued and the ex post performance of banks is 
hard to ignore.  
 
Figure 2c shows the TARP funds received by banks and the total amount paid back to 
date (July 2010).  The figure shows some striking results. In the 2007-2009 period, all the 
banks (excluding the GSEs) which had received TARP funding had paid at least 45% of 
the amount as dividends in 2007-20009.  JP Morgan, had paid out $12 billion dollars, 
almost half of the TARP funds it eventually received from the government.  Similarly 
Bank of America and Citigroup which received $45 billion each in TARP funds had paid 
out $21 billion and $17 billion respectively in 2007-2009. 
 
Tables 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b (and corresponding Figures 4a and 4b) show that the evidence 
thus far masks one important fact – that banks had in fact been paying out significant 
dividends, not just during 2000-2006 but also during the crisis period of 2007-2009.  
Bank dividend payouts measured as a percentage of assets in 2002 were at 0.26% and in 
2008 during the peak of the crisis, dividend levels fell to 0.17%.  This ratio fell in 2009 to 
0.05%.  In effect, bank management did not drastically reduce their dividends in the first 
twelve months of the worst crisis to have hit them.  
 
Table 4 gives the dividends paid by the 25 financial firms since the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in the summer of 2007.  The largest dividends were paid by Bank of 
America and Citigroup, with their dividends showing no slowdown until Q308.  While 
dividend payments slowed for both banks from 4Q08 to 4Q09, Bank of America 
continued to payout dividends till the end of 4Q09.  Citigroup on the other hand cut its 
dividends only in 4Q08 and paid zero dividends from 2Q09 to 4Q09.  Merrill Lynch 
almost doubled its dividends in 4Q08 (to $699 million) compared to the year earlier in 
4Q07 ($361 million).  Similarly, Lehman increased its dividends from $95 million in 
2Q08 to $118 million in 3Q08 right before it went bankrupt.  Bear Stearns also increased 
dividends from $36 million in 4Q07 to $47 million in 1Q08.  Of particular note, Goldman 
Sachs continued to pay dividends until the end of 2009.  Goldman Sachs increased 
dividends from $639 million in 2007 to $642 million in 2008 and to $717 million in 
2009.  On the other hand, while Morgan Stanley cut its dividends to zero in 1Q09, it 
resumed dividends beginning 2Q09.  However, 2Q09 dividends were at only $80 million 
(only 28% of dividends in 2Q08).   
 
In contrast to investment banks, Wachovia and Washington Mutual cut their dividends 
drastically in the quarters leading up to their failure.  Wachovia cut its dividends from 
$808 million in 2Q08 to $108 million in 3Q08.  Similarly, Washington Mutual cut its 
dividends from $130 million in 1Q08 to $10 million in 2Q08.  Similarly the GSEs Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac cut their dividends to zero in 4Q08 and 3Q08 respectively. 
 
Table 5 gives the quarterly losses incurred by the financial firms in our analysis. This 
table highlights the fact that these financial firms were struggling during this period and  
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yet continued to pay out dividends as described above.  Particularly, Lehman which 
increased dividends in 3Q08 posted losses of $5.3 billion in 2Q08 and $7.0 billion in 
3Q08 before filing for bankruptcy.  Bear Stearns which increased dividends in 1Q08 
posted losses of $1.9 billion in Q407 and $0.6 in Q108.  Fannie and Freddie posted losses 
of $138.7 billion and $115.1 billion for the period from 3Q07 to 4Q09.  Wachovia which 
cut dividends in 3Q08 reported $29.4 billion in losses, a jump of 124% from $13.1 billion 
losses the previous quarter.  Similarly Wamu which cut dividends in 2Q08 and 3Q08 
reported losses of $5.5 billion in 2Q08 and $30.9 billion in 3Q08. 
 
 
 Lessons from private contracting 
 




 Lehman Brothers Holdings announced a 13% increase in its 
dividend and a $100 million share repurchase in January 2008; Citigroup cut its dividend 
close to zero only in November 2009; JPMorgan and Wells Fargo, while recipients of the 
TARP capital in Fall 2008 cut dividends as late as February and March 2009, 
respectively; and even as the Federal Reserve was urging banks receiving bailout funds to 
cut dividends, Goldman Sachs did not cut dividends throughout the crisis period.  
This is to be compared to the fact that 61 components of the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock 
index cut their dividends during 2008. Most corporate debt has covenants which prevent 
banks from paying out dividends when negative earnings are reported.  This constraint 
prevents firms from transfer of funds to equity holders at the expense of debt holders. 
  
Additionally, firms cut dividends to avoid the debt overhang problem (Myers (1977)).  A 
debt overhang emerges if a company is unable to make new investments since it is unable 
to raise new debt as lenders are unwilling to lend to highly levered firms.  Firms 
anticipating such opportunities maintain an equity cushion and thus cut dividends in 
times of distress. 
 
In contrast, banks have continued to pay out dividends even during the crisis.  This can be 
attributed to the short-term nature of their funding and the implicit and explicit 
guarantees provided by the government. Banks are typically funded by short-term debt. 
As a result, if they were to announce a dividend cut, rollover debt can “run” as it did on 
investment banks.  The fear of “runs” leads banks to continue paying dividends even 
when it would be prudent for them in the long-run to cut dividends.   
 
Further banks benefit from the explicit and implicit guarantees provided by the 
government.  The explicit government guarantees provided on deposits for commercial 
                                                 
 
7 See Table 4 for bank by bank history of dividend distributions. Also see the press articles: Dividends Cut 
Fastest Since 1950s as Citigroup Conserves Cash (Bloomberg, November 26, 2009); JPMorgan Cuts 
Dividend 87 Percent to 5 Cents a Share (Bloomberg, February 23, 2009),  Fed Urges Banks to Put Bailout 
Funds Into Loans, Not  Dividends (Bloomberg, February 24, 2009), Wells Fargo Cuts Its Dividend 85% 
(Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2009).   
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banks ensures that the banks are protected even in the event of a failure.  Similarly, many 
financial institutions may have the implicit government guarantee for firms which are 
considered too-big-to-fail.  Thus, banks are unlikely to cut dividends, figuring that in the 
event that they do fail, they would most likely be bailed out. 
 
The contrast between stressed depository institutions (such as Wachovia and Wamu) and 
investment banks (such as Lehman, Merrill Lynch) is already informative. While 
depositories were subject to a “prompt corrective action” resolution regime, such orderly 
wind-down plans were absent for investment banks. Hence, the implicit too-big-to- fail 
guarantee for investment banks was virtually free of any end-game restrictions, allowing 
them to pay dividends even as they were failing.  
 
This contrasting behavior of banks versus non-financial firms provides important lessons 
for reform of governing bank regulation.  Regulators have realized that banks need to be 
explicitly prevented from paying out dividends in times of distress to avoid such transfers 
in violation of priority of debt over equity.  As Lawrence Summers, Director of the 
National Economic Council notes in his letter on the Senate and House of Representative 
(January 12, 2009): 
 
“Those receiving exceptional assistance will be subject to tough but 
sensible conditions that limit executive compensation until taxpayer 
money is paid back, ban dividend payments beyond de minimis 
amounts, and put limits on stock buybacks and the acquisition of 
already financed strong companies” 
 
The evidence suggests that such restrictions provide better incentives for banks to behave
more like non-financial firms in the event of a crisis.  In later sections, we further draw 
on the lessons learnt from private contracting and provide recommendations for the 
design of prompt corrective measures for governing bank regulation.  
 
 
Two Notions of Capital 
 
To understand the significance of common equity and its role in bank resolution, it is 
important to distinguish between two different notions of bank capital.  There is, first, the 
notion of bank capital (implicit in the Basel approach) as a buffer against loss that 
protects depositors.  Under this first notion of bank capital, hybrid claims such as 
preferred equity or subordinated debt are counted as bank capital, since both are claims 
that are junior to depositors.   
 
However, there is a second, contrasting notion of bank capital as the claim held by the 
owners of the bank who have control over the bank’s operations.   Hybrid claims such as 
preferred shares or subordinated debt do not qualify as bank capital under this second 
notion of bank capital, as they can be seen as junior forms of debt.  We could dub this 
second notion of capital as “pure equity capital”.  This notion of capital can be thought of 
as the equity demanded by creditors as a safeguard against losses on their stake.  It is  
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analogous to the margin requirement set by creditors on leveraged traders, and is 
exemplified by the “haircut” demanded by creditors in a repurchase agreement.  In 
contrast to the Basel capital requirement (which is a regulatory capital requirement), we 
could characterize the pure equity requirement in the margin or haircut set by a creditor 
as the “market-determined” capital requirement.  Just as with repo haircuts and margin 
requirements, the market determined capital requirement fluctuates over time with shifts 
in market conditions and the balance sheet capacity of leveraged traders.   
 
The key difference between the Basel notion of capital as a buffer to protect depositors 
and pure equity capital as the market-determined haircut lies in the behavior of those 
owners who have control over the bank.  When the bank has too little pure equity capital, 
the owners’ incentives reflect their highly leveraged balance sheet.  When faced with a 
dwindling stake in a leveraged entity, controlling owners have little to lose, and 
everything to gain by engaging in risk-shifting bets on the bank.  The increased haircut 
imposed by the capital market during distress episodes could be seen as the increased 
margin demanded by creditors in the capital market to changed incentives, or the 





The market-determined capital requirement reflected in the repo haircut is a constraint 
imposed by the capital market, and reflects the terms on which creditors are willing to 
lend to those with control over the leveraged entity.  One plausible channel through 
which the constraint operates is the wish by creditors to avoid being embroiled in a 
lengthy and costly bankruptcy settlement after the borrower has defaulted.  When a bank 
breaches the maximum leverage ratio permitted by the market, the bank must take 
remedial action to reduce its leverage, or face a run by its creditors.  
 
When bank capital is viewed as the equity that creditors demand in the market, then there 
is a maximum degree of leverage that the market will permit.  The haircut in a repo 
contract encapsulates such a notion of equity.  The market demands a minimum stake to 
be held by the entity that controls the asset.  As the market haircut fluctuates in line with 
capital market conditions, so will the maximum leverage that the market permits.  If a 
bank breaches the maximum leverage, it must find new equity to bring down leverage or 
face a run by its creditors.   
 
We have seen that throughout the recent crisis, banks have lost pure equity capital 
through credit losses and dividend payouts, but have not replenished the lost pure equity 
capital through the issuance of new common equity.  Instead, the lion’s share of new 
capital raised has been in the form of hybrid claims such as preferred shares and 
subordinated debt.  In particular, government-sponsored capital injections have taken the 
form of preferred equity, especially in the United States under the TARP program.  The 
consequence has been that pure equity capital continued to dwindle during the crisis 
period. 
                                                 
 
12 Acharya and Viswanathan (2007) build a model of funding liquidity of financial institutions tied to such 




It would be reasonable to conjecture that the stringency in credit conditions reflects, at 
least in part, the lack of pure equity capital in the banking system.  The market-
determined capital requirement was binding as hard as ever, even though the constraints 
of the regulatory Basel capital requirements were relaxed through the injection of hybrid 
claims.  Without concerted efforts to relax the market-determined capital requirements 
that are pressing down on the banks, it would be difficult to expect much headway in 





The distinction between regulatory (Basel) capital and pure equity capital can also be 
seen through the evolution of various bank leverage ratios.  The examination underscores 
the earlier evidence that asset growth of banks in the period 2000-2007 was funded 
primarily through debt, especially through short-term debt, and not through the build up 
of common equity capital. 
 
Table 6 shows the leverage ratios for the 25 large financial firms in our sample – divided 
into commercial banks, investment banks and GSEs
8
 
 – for the fiscal years 2000 through 
2007.  The numbers reported are averages within each division.  Figures 6a-6d are based 
on the time-series evolution of four of these ratios, which we focus on in our discussion. 
Figure 6a shows the corporate finance measure of leverage – the debt/shareholder equity 
ratio, and Figure 6b shows another measure - the assets/common equity ratio (common 
equity being shareholder equity minus preferred equity).  In both cases, the pattern for 
commercial and investment banks is similar. For both commercial and investment banks, 
the capital structure was getting increasingly levered from 2000 to 2007.  The debt/ 
shareholder equity ratio for commercial banks increased from around 5.19 in Q100 to 
6.79 in Q407, whereas for investment banks, it increased from 16.19 to 19.39.  For GSEs 
this ratio decreased from 30.92 to 21.62. The assets/common equity ratio for commercial 
banks grew from 15.0 to 22.51, and for investment banks this ratio grew from 26.90 to 
35.85 for the same period. For GSEs this ratio increased from 39.59 to 41.85.  
 
Table 6c shows the asset/ shareholder ratio for large US financial firms. For commercial 
banks this ratio increased from 14.68 to 22.11. For investment banks, the Q100 ratio was 
much higher at 26.13 and increased to 33.91 in Q407. For GSEs this ratio decreased from 
32.8 to 23.57 during the same period. 
 
Table 7 and corresponding Figure 7 show the change in asset to common equity ratio 
during the crisis for the large US financial firms in our sample. This ratio increased from 
1Q07 to the peak of the crisis in 2Q and 3Q2008 for most firms. Of note, the ratio for 
Citigroup increased from 16.69 in 1Q07 to 27.32 in 4Q08. The ratio for Lehman also 
increased from 29.73 in Q107 to 33.16 in 2Q08 just before it went bankrupt. This 
                                                 
 
8 See Appendix C for the classification of each bank into commercial bank or investment bank.  
 
12 
increase in asset to common equity ratio was even more dramatic for the GSEs as they 
became distressed. The ratio for Fannie Mae peaked in 3Q08 at 67.47 from a much lower 
25.32 in Q107. For Fannie Mae, commercial paper/assets increased from 34.62 to a 
staggering 853.44 in 2Q08. 
 
It is clear thus that the asset growth that banks experienced during 2000 to 2007 was 
increasingly funded by debt.  What kind of debt? To shed light on this, we plot in Figure 
6d the ratio of commercial paper to total assets for commercial banks, investment banks 
and GSEs in our sample.  While investment banks were always financed in a significant 
way through unsecured short-term commercial paper, what is striking is that commercial 
banks increased their reliance on commercial paper nine-fold from fiscal year 2000 to 
fiscal year 2007.  In 4Q07, commercial paper was 3% of assets for commercial banks.  
This is comparable to investment banks with a ratio of 2.88% in 4Q07. 
 
Further, while the growth in loans and assets was primarily of the long-term type – 
mortgages to a large extent and corporate and private equity finance to some extent – the 
nature of non-deposit debt financing was in fact of the short-term type.  That is, bank 
capital structures were not only looking increasingly levered and funded through non-
deposit type debt, they were also experiencing a rise in maturity mismatch (or duration 
gap between assets and liabilities) and were thus vulnerable to economy-wide shocks that 
generally tend to cripple the markets for short-term financing.   
 
This short-term aspect of bank leverage is captured in Tables 8 and 9, and corresponding 
Figure 8.  Table 8 shows the worldwide quarterly outstanding amounts for commercial 
paper – usually of 90-day maturity and more than 75% of which tends to be issued by 
financial institutions.  From a steady issuance of around $1.4-1.5 trillion per quarter 
during 2000-2004, the amount rose sharply to a peak of $2.14 trillion during 2Q07.  
Following the money-market freeze of August 9, 2007, the figure fell sharply from its 
peak to around $1.62 trillion in 3Q08 (picking up somewhat in 4Q08 due to guarantees, 
for example, by the Federal Reserve).  In 2009, commercial paper issuance declined 
further and in 4Q09 this figure was around $1.14 trillion. 
 
Viewed from any dimension – overall leverage, deposit versus non-deposit leverage, and 
maturity of leverage – banks were pursuing a risk-shifting strategy, and importantly, not 
just through their choice of assets, but also through their capital structures. 
 
There is one important lesson for bank regulation in all this.  While standard corporate 
finance measures of capital, dividend distribution and leverage were individually and 
jointly implying that bank behavior reflected a serious conflict of interest between 
shareholders and creditors, regulatory measures of capital adequacy – for example, the 
ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets – hardly moved (see, for example, Box 1.3 of IMF, 
2008).  Why was this so?  While some of this had to do with the large holdings of AAA-
rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities on bank balance-sheets, which attracted 
little capital charge and thus kept the level of risk-adjusted assets (the denominator) to a 





Implications for reform of financial regulation 
 
The distinction between Basel capital and pure equity capital emphasized here have 
important implications for the reform of financial regulation and the resolution of 
problem banks that can lead to a speedy recovery in lending.   
 
To some extent, some inertia is inevitable in the valuation of bank assets, even in a world 
where the rigorous application of mark-to-market valuation rules are the preferred norm.  
Even under the original version of accounting standards such as the US accounting 
standard 157 of the FASB, or the International Accounting Standards Board rule IAS 39, 
full and immediate marking to market of assets is infeasible due to the lack of transparent 
markets.  There is the larger issue of whether full marking to market is even desirable 
from a financial stability viewpoint.  Here, we will not address this particular debate.  
However, even for a fervent supporter of full marking to market as an ideal, the practical 
limitation of marking to market of bank assets means that inertia is an inevitable feature 
of bank balance sheet accounting.   
 
In a world where bank balance sheets lag market conditions, or where the accounting 
values do not anticipate further credit losses from foreseeable weakening of 
macroeconomic activity, an early suspension of dividends and capital preservation is one 
policy that could help forestall greater problems with capital erosion in the future.  
Another policy that could help with capital preservation is a “covenant” style private 
contract imposed by the prudential regulator that restricts banks from paying out 
dividends when certain thresholds are reached.  The covenant thresholds may be based on 
simple leverage measures such as asset to common equity ratios, loans to deposits and 
short-term debt to assets.  Additionally, market measures such as equity retention implied 
by repo haircuts may provide more timely information and prevent further equity erosion 
by forcing banks to stop paying out dividends in times of distress.  The recently agreed 
Basel III rules set a minimum common equity threshold of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets 
plus a “conservation buffer” of 2.5%.  The conservation buffer can be breached during 
crises, but the intention is that banks that breach it will face limitations on the payout of 
dividends or on compensation of its employees.  Debate is possible on whether 4.5% + 
2.5% is large enough, and whether the Basel risk-weighting schemes are based on 
relevant criteria such as systemic risk, but the form of the new Basel III rules take 
account of some of the lessons mentioned above. 
 
From the point of view of overall financial system stability and the externalities imposed 
by one institution on the system as a whole, an early suspension of dividends can be 
justified by the prevention of negative spillover effects imposed by incumbent controlling 
shareholders of weakening banks on the rest of the system.  Although such interference in 
the management of the firm runs counter to the autonomy of the controlling shareholders 
in determining the financial decisions of the firm, it should be borne in mind that banking 
has always offered exceptions to the autonomy of the firm when externalities are 
involved.  The fact that banks have been regulated reflects their special status.  They 
exert externalities on the rest of the financial system so that the affairs of the bank affect  
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a very broad constituency that go beyond the traditional domain of the owners and 
creditors of the firm.  They affect the broader economy and are supported by both explicit 
and implicit public funding support in case of difficulties.  The very fact that banks are 
regulated, and special legal regimes exist to deal with problems of distress reflect their 
special status.  An early suspension of dividends is merely re-drawing the line between 
the private and public domains of actions.   
 
Thus, an early imposition of regulatory sanctions against the paying of dividends (for 
instance, as part of an increasing “ladder of sanctions” that are based on market or 
common-equity based notions of bank leverage) may have an important place in the 
agenda for reform of the regulatory system.  The proposals in the Geneva Report 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009) argue for such a ladder of sanctions.  Acharya, Mehran, and 
Thakor (2010) suggest creating a capital account by diverting dividends during good 
times which are then transferred to a regulator when the bank goes bankrupt.  Recently, 
Eric Rosengren, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has argued for a 
similar prompt suspension of dividends as the first step in dealing with a banking crisis 





In this paper, we have delved deeper into the evolution of bank capital during the current 
global financial crisis.  The crisis which initially erupted in 2007 in the subprime 
mortgage sector in the United States has led to a decline in real economic activity, 
leading to further credit losses in other mainstream credit categories such as prime 
mortgages, commercial real estate, corporate debt and other household debt such as credit 
card loans and auto loans.   
 
Even as banks and financial intermediaries have suffered large credit losses as the 
financial crisis has gathered pace, the headline numbers obscure important shifts in the 
composition of bank capital, and hence on the constraints banks face in their daily 
operations.  We have shown that the bulk of the new capital raised both from private 
investors and from government-funded capital injections have been in the form of debt-
like hybrid claims such as preferred equity and subordinated debt, and not in the form of 
common equity.  Furthermore, banks have continued to pay large sums in the form of 
dividends that have further eroded the common equity base. 
 
As a result, there has been a relentless increase in the leverage of the banking sector, 
when leverage is measured with common equity on the denominator.  We have argued 
that common equity is the more appropriate notion of bank capital when we want to 
capture the idea of market-based capital requirements that creditors would like to impose 
on borrowers.  The alternative notion of bank capital which includes subordinate debt and 
hybrid claims (as a buffer against loss for depositors) is less appropriate, even though this 




We argued that continuing dividend payments during the crisis represent a transfer from 
equity holders of banks to creditors (and taxpayers) in violation of the priority of debt 
over equity.  We have further argued that the increased riskiness of the remaining assets 
of the bank represent a type of risk-shifting that benefits equity holders at the expense of 
creditors (and taxpayers).   
 
In general, the events of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 have posed several challenging 
questions on the proper notion of bank capital that should inform bank regulation.  We 





Acharya, Viral V., Philipp Schnabl and Gustavo Suarez (2009) Securitization without 
risk transfer, Working Paper, New York University Stern School of Business. 
 
Acharya, Viral V., Hamid Mehran and Anjan V. Thakor (2010) Caught between Scylla 
and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent Seeking and Risk 
Shifting, FRB of New York Staff Report. 
 
Acharya, Viral V. and S. Viswanathan (2007) Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity, 
Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin (2008) Liquidity and Leverage, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, forthcoming. 
 
Brunnermeier, Markus, Andrew Crockett, Charles Goodhart, Avinash Persaud and Hyun 
Song Shin (2009) The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation 11
th Geneva 
Report on the World Economy, http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/2796  
 
Diamond, Douglas W., Raghuram G. Rajan (2009) Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit 
Freeze, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Dudley, William C. (2009) Financial Market Turmoil: The Federal Reserve and the 
challenges ahead, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations Corporate Conference, 
New York City, http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2009/dud090306.html 
 
Ivashina, Victoria and David S. Scharfstein (2008) Bank lending during the financial 
crisis of 2008, Working Paper, Harvard Business School. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2008) International Monetary Fund Global Financial 
Stability Report – Containing Systemic Risk and Restoring Financial Soundness, April 
2008. 
 
Jensen, Michael C., William H. Meckling (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 
305-360. 
 
Lehman Brothers Report, April 2008 
 
Myers, Stewart C. (1977) Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5(2), 147-175. 
 
Myers, Stewart C., and Nicholas S. Majluf (1984) Corporate financing and investment 
decisions when firms have information investors do not have, Journal of Financial 




Rosengren, Eric (2010) “Dividend Policy and Capital Retention: A Systemic “First 
Response” speech delivered at the Rethinking Central Banking conference, Washington 
DC, October 10, 2010. 
http://www.bos.frb.org/news/speeches/rosengren/2010/101010/101010.pdf  
 
Scharfstein, David S. and Jeremy C. Stein (2008) This Bailout Doesn’t Pay Dividends, 
The New York Times, October 20, 2008. 
 
Tucker, Paul (2008) Monetary Policy and the Financial System, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, Q2, 203-206.  
   
Wessel, David (2008) “Brainstorming about Bailouts” Wall Street Journal, March 13
th 2008 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120536045253831681.html 








'Billions)  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09  Total Loss 
Worldwide  58.7  216.7  220.9  174.6  263.6  385.1  140.7  147.3  35.2  80.5  1,723.3 
Americas  42.9  128.3  135.1  112.5  205.6  243.3  101.0  99.5  28.9  48.2  1,145.3 
Europe  14.5  76.9  74.3  58.3  52.2  137.5  36.1  47.7  6.7  32.8  537.0 
Asia  1.3  11.4  11.4  3.7  5.7  4.4  3.6  0.1  -.4  -0.6  40.6 
 
Source: Bloomberg WDCI 
 
Table 1b  
Table 1b – Capital Raised (WDCI) - for all financial firms including banks, brokers, insurers and GSEs 
during 2007-2008 
 
(USD 'Billions)  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09  Total 
Worldwide  14.8  74.1  89.7  199.4  107.7  427.9  241.1  125.8  66.8  101.6  1,448.9 
Americas  3.1  47.1  63  103.8  44.1  266.6  122  91.8  16.1  21.1  778.7 
Europe  11.7  26.9  23  82  54.9  132.7  99.6  13.7  30.7  75.1  550.3 
Asia  0  0  3.7  13.5  8.7  28.6  19.5  20.3  20.0  5.4  119.7 
 
Source: Bloomberg WDCI 
 















Capital Raised (3Q 2007 - 4Q 2009), classified by 
Type of Capital ($bn)
Capital Raised Losses 
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Table 2a – Capital Raised by Type of Capital for 25 large financial firms from 2000 – 2006 
 
($ bn)    Type of Investor  Total 
Geography  Name  Common  Preferred  Debt  Capital Raised 
U.S  JP Morgan  8.8  -2.2  54.1  60.8 
U.S  Wells Fargo  -9.0  2.9  57.4  51.3 
U.S  Lehman Brothers  0.7  0.5  52.5  53.7 
U.S  Wachovia Corp.  -12.1  0.0  33.2  21.1 
U.S  Citigroup  7.1  -0.9  153.5  159.7 
U.S  Washington Mutual  -9.4  2.9  1.6  -4.9 
U.S  Merrill Lynch  -9.0  2.7  112.6  106.3 
U.S  Morgan Stanley  -12.5  3.1  105.8  96.3 
U.S  Bank of America  -34.2  2.6  52.7  21.1 
U.S  Goldman Sachs  -17.7  3.1  139.6  124.9 
U.S  Fannie Mae  -1.7  0.4  220.6  219.3 
U.S  Freddie Mac  -2.0  1.5  18.2  17.6 
U.S  Bear Stearns  -1.0  0.0  27.4  26.3 
U.K  Royal Bank of Scotland  10.8  12.4  22.8  46 
U.K  HSBC  4.6  7.1  12.8  24.5 
U.K  Barclays Plc  -1.9  -0.4  16.4  14.1 
U.K  HBOS  2.1  1.5  21.9  25.5 
U.K  Lloyds TSB  0.8  0.0  7.1  7.9 
Europe  IKB  7.1  8.3  15.5  31 
Europe  UBS  -2.7  0.0  92.7  90 
Europe  Credit Suisse  5.7  0.0  61.3  66.9 
Europe  Deutsche Bank  2.0  0.9  72.0  74.9 
Europe  Fortis Bank  0.5  0.0  53.5  53.9 
  TOTAL  -63.0  46.3  1405.2  1388.3 
 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings and Bloomberg 
Note: Data not available for BNP Paribas and ABN AMRO 
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Figure 2a –Capital Raised, classified by Type of Capital for 25 large financial firms from 2000 - 2006 
  
  








Capital Raised (2000 - 2006), Classified by Type of Capital ($ bn)
Common Preferred Debt 
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Table 2b – Total Capital Raised by Type of Capital for 25 large financial firms from 1Q07 to 4Q09 
 
 
($ Bn)    Type of Investor  Total Capital 
Raised 
 
Losses Incurred * 
  Geography  Name  Common  Preferred  Debt 
U.S  JP Morgan  19.2  28.7  51.1  99.0  62.8 
U.S  Wells Fargo  28.8  22.7  -40.9  10.5  43 
U.S  Lehman Brothers  0.1  5.9  50.1  56.0  16.2 
U.S  Wachovia Corp.  3.1  9.7  44.8  57.5  101.8 
U.S  Citigroup  25.4  69.6  -3.2  91.9  123.9 
U.S 
Washington 
Mutual  -1.5  9.4  -11.4  -3.5  45.1 
U.S  Merrill Lynch  9.4  10.4  32.3  52.1  55.9 
U.S  Morgan Stanley  1.9  8.0  -46.2  -36.3  23.4 
U.S  Bank of America  20.9  66.3  13.7  100.9  89.2 
U.S  Goldman Sachs  2.8  3.8  55.5  62.1  9.2 
U.S  Fannie Mae  16.1  15.3  -30.9  0.5  138.7 
U.S  Freddie Mac  -1.0  7.9  -36.7  -29.8  115.1 
U.S  Bear Stearns  -1.5  0.0  13.3  11.8  3.2 
U.K 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland  0.2  -0.9  -5.0  -5.7  56.7 
U.K  HSBC  28.8  0.0  17.1  45.9  55.8 
U.K  Barclays Plc.  16.2  0.0  13.1  29.4  39.7 
U.K  HBOS  4.8  0.0  6.5  11.3  26.3 
U.K  Lloyds TSB  36.2  0.0  -3.0  33.2  3.2 
Europe  IKB  0.2  -1.9  -4.1  -5.8  12.5 
Europe  UBS  0.00  0.00  54.2  54.2  57 
Europe  Credit Suisse  2.4  0.0  25.2  27.7  18.9 
Europe  Deutsche Bank  0.6  8.7  -5.1  4.3  19.5 
Europe  Fortis Bank  25.1  0.0  15.4  40.5  8 
Europe  BNP Paribas  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  19.1 
Europe  ABN AMRO  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.9 
  TOTAL  238.1  263.6  205.8  707.6  1146.1 
  
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Compustat and Bloomberg  
Note: Capital Raised data not available for BNP Paribas and ABN AMRO 
 * Losses incurred for the crisis period from 3Q2007 to 4Q2009 
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Figure 2b: Capital Raised, classified by Type of Capital for 25 large financial firms from 2007 - 2009 
 
  
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Compustat and Bloomberg  
 




Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings and Bloomberg  













































Capital raised, TARP funds and Dividends($ bn)
Capital Raised Bailout Dividends Table 2c - Quarterly Capital Raised by large financial firms from 1Q07 to 4Q09 
 
Geography  ($ Bn)  1Q07  2Q07  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09 
Total 
Capital Raised 
U.S  JP Morgan  5.0  14.8  23.5  -0.1  1.9  12.5  2.5  37.6  -1.2  10.2  -4.2  -3.4  99.0 
U.S  Wells Fargo  2.0  2.6  -0.1  1.1  0.5  2.1  4.8  33.6  -13.6  -8.4  -19.0  4.9  10.5 
U.S  Lehman Brothers  12.8  10.7  16.4  0.2  8.1  7.8  -  -  -  -  -  -  56.0 
U.S  Wachovia Corp.  3.6  -0.9  16.4  4.7  18.1  16.7  -1.1  -  -  -  -  -  57.5 
U.S  Citigroup  9.8  16.6  13.5  13.2  11.8  12.7  -18.9  29.4  -8.7  2.2  13.1  -2.8  91.9 
U.S  Washington Mutual  -1.5  1.6  -1.1  -0.8  -7.8  6.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -3.5 
U.S  Merrill Lynch  23.7  20.4  30.1  -1.8  -1.0  19.5  -18.6  -20.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  52.1 
U.S  Morgan Stanley  14.5  9.8  3.5  10.8  5.2  8.8  -1.8  -93.1  5.0  -4.7  2.7  7.6  -31.6 
U.S  Bank of America  4.7  17.4  13.3  1.8  13.1  13.4  -9.1  36.1  19.5  6.3  0.1  -16.0  100.9 
U.S  Goldman Sachs  11.3  10.9  19.2  8.0  11.7  8.2  -3.1  4.8  6.3  -5.3  -2.5  -7.3  62.1 
U.S  Fannie Mae  5.0  10.0  -7.5  -38.3  -97.4  101.0  -8.4  -11.6  54.8  12.4  -0.8  -18.6  0.5 
U.S  Freddie Mac  0.0  11.2  -13.9  -29.9  16.8  35.5  364.1  -443.0  78.2  -16.9  -12.6  -19.5  -29.8 
U.S  Bear Stearns  4.1  2.8  3.2  0.8  0.8  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  11.7 
U.K 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland  -  -  -  5.9  -  -  -  1.1  -  -  -  -12.7  -5.7 
U.K  HSBC  -  -  -  10.1  -  -  -  9.1  -  -  -  26.7  45.9 
U.K  Barclays Plc.  -  -  -  9.2  -  -  -  20.3  -  -  -  -0.1  29.4 
U.K  HBOS  -  -  -  6.5  -  -  -  4.8  -  -  -  0.0  11.3 
U.K  Lloyds TSB  -  -  -  0.2  -  -  -  1.5  -  -  -  31.5  33.2 
Europe  IKB  -  -  -  4.4  -  -  -  1.0  -  -  -  -11.2  -5.8 
Europe  UBS  -  -  -  42.8  -  -  -  9.5  -  -  -  2.0  54.2 
Europe  Credit Suisse  -  -  -  14.0  -  -  -  23.0  -  -  -  -9.3  27.7 
Europe  Deutsche Bank  -  -  -  -0.8  -  -  -  4.6  -  -  -  0.4  4.3 
Europe  Fortis Bank  -  -  -  46.7  -  -  -  -0.8  -  -  -  -5.4  40.5 
  TOTAL  95.0  127.9  116.7  108.7  -18.1  244.0  310.5  -352.4  140.4  -4.3  -23.1  -33.1  712.2 
 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Compustat and Bloomberg  
Note: Capital Raised data not available for BNP Paribas and ABN AMROTable 3a – Quarterly Dividends Paid by US Banks and GSEs 
 





Average  1Q07  2Q07  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09 
Total Dividend 
Paid  6.38  10.45  10.64  11.21  11.19  9.71  9.20  8.45  6.35  1.97  0.72  0.78  0.78 
Quarterly 
Dividends as % 
of Assets* 
0.08%  0.09%  0.08%  0.09%  0.09%  0.07%  0.07%  0.07%  0.06%  0.02%  0.01%  0.01%  0.01% 
 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Compustat and Bloomberg 
* Calculated as Total dividends paid by all banks as % of sum of assets of all banks. Other ratios are computed in similar manner in the tables that follow. 
 
Table 3b – Annual Dividends Paid by Non - US Banks 
 





Average  1H07  2H07  1H08  2H08  1H09  2H09 
Total Dividend 
Paid  5.98  12.57  30.11  6.99  11.77  2.80  8.71 
Quarterly 
Dividends as % 
of Assets* 
0.07%  0.07%  0.14%  0.03%  0.06%  0.01%  0.05% 
 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Compustat and Bloomberg 
* Calculated as Total dividends paid by all banks as % of sum of assets of all banks. Other ratios are computed in similar manner in the tables that follow. 
 Table 4a – Quarterly Dividends paid by each US Bank  
 





















2000-2006  25,603  19,438  1,053  14,879  42,237  9,876  4,308  5,107  38,756  2,632  2,741  2,848  2,943 
1Q07  1,197  948  81  1,071  2,682  477  294  272  2,502  163  390  335  38 
2Q07  1,328  937  81  1,066  2,671  484  292  269  2,494  161  490  326  38 
3Q07  1,320  1,034  81  1,215  2,690  486  288  271  2,829  150  489  324  37 
4Q07  1,320  1,036  81  1,265  2,690  482  361  270  2,830  165  487  167  36 
1Q08  1,326  1,024  94  1,274  1,676  130  341  276  2,859  157  344  162  47 
2Q08  1,362  1,026  95  808  1,753  10  344  280  2,858  156  343  162  - 
3Q08  1,462  1,128  118  108  1,746  -  469  281  2,929  155  54  0  - 
4Q08  1,483  1,134  -  107  875  -  699  273  1,610  174  0  0  - 
1Q09  242  1,443  -  -  54  -  0  0  64  167  0  0  - 
2Q09  163  214  -  -  0  -  0  80  86  180  0  0  - 
3Q09  207  234  -  -  0  -  0  65  88  184  0  0  - 
4Q09  208  238  -  -  0  -  0  65  88  186  0  0  - 
2007-2009  11,618  10,396  631  6,914  16,837  2,069  3,088  2,402  21,237  1,998  2,597  1,475  196 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Bloomberg and Compustat 
 





Scotland  HSBC 
Barclays 
Plc.  HBOS 
Lloyds 











2000-2006  20,169  44,839  16,540  11,451  21,799  512  2,625  5,605  8,596  10,397  12,936  12,058 
1H07  1,911  3,982  1,440  1,226  1,245  -  0  0  0  1,269  0  1,497 
2H07  4,215  6,511  3,094  2,443  2,833  -  0  2,328  3,091  1,435  4,159  0 
1H08  0  2,113  1,445  -  1,280  -  0  0  0  2,154  0  0 
2H08  4,002  5,600  301  -  0  -  0  109  420  0  1,342  0 
1H09  0  2,800  0  -  0  -  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2H09  0  3,101  288  -  0  -  0  2,190  650  0  2,479  0 
2007-2009  10,129  24,107  6,569  3,669  5,358  -  0  4,627  4,161  4,859  7,980  1,497 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Bloomberg and Compustat 
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Figure 4a – Quarterly Dividends paid by US banks 
 
Source: Annual statements of Banks, SEC Filings, Bloomberg and Compustat  
 
Figure 4b –Semi Annual Dividends paid by non-US Banks  
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1H07 2H07 1H08 2H08 1H09 2H09
Semi-Annual Dividends Paid by Non-US Banks ($ bn)Table 5 Quarterly Losses incurred by Large Financial Firms 
 
($ bn)  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09  Total 
JP Morgan  2.5  2.8  5.9  4.0  8.1  9.8  7.7  8.0  7.8  6.2  62.8 
Wells Fargo  0.0  2.6  2.2  4.5  5.5  8.6  4.3  4.7  5.6  5.0  43.0 
Lehman  0.7  0.8  2.4  5.3  7.0  -  -  -  -  -  16.2 
Wachovia  1.7  3.3  4.5  13.1  29.4  49.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  101.8 
Citigroup  5.6  18.2  19.6  12.2  12.8  19.7  13.8  10.3  5.6  6.1  123.9 
Wamu  0.9  3.9  3.9  5.5  30.9  -  -  -  -  -  45.1 
Merrill  9.4  18.0  7.6  8.9  12.0  0.0  -  -  -  -  55.9 
Morgan Stanley  0.9  9.4  2.3  1.8  1.3  5.8  1.2  0.2  0.4  0.1  23.4 
Bank of America  2.1  7.6  6.3  5.5  6.7  14.5  13.8  13.3  10.1  9.3  89.2 
Goldman Sachs  1.5  -0.5  2.0  0.8  1.1  2.3  0.8  1.2  0.0  0.0  9.2 
Fannie Mae  3.7  5.2  9.5  15.4  20.0  17.0  19.3  24.0  13.5  11.1  138.7 
Freddie Mac  3.1  6.1  15.2  13.0  19.0  22.2  13.5  24.5  -6.1  4.6  115.1 
Bear Stearns  0.7  1.9  0.6  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  3.2 
RBS  0.0  2.8  0.0  9.9  0.3  17.2  0.0  15.8  1.0  9.7  56.7 
HSBC  0.9  7.6  2.6  10.8  4.8  15.6  0.0  7.9  0.0  5.6  55.8 
Barclays  0.0  3.5  1.5  4.4  0.0  11.1  3.4  8.2  0.0  7.6  39.7 
HBOS  0.0  1.1  4.2  0.2  3.7  17.1  -  -  -  -  26.3 
Lloyds TSB  0.0  0.4  0.0  1.3  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.2 
IKB  0.0  0.0  12.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  12.5 
UBS  4.7  14.6  19.5  6.0  4.7  4.0  3.5  0.2  -0.1  -0.1  57.0 
Credit Suisse  1.9  4.0  5.3  0.0  2.9  3.3  1.4  0.0  0.1  0.0  18.9 
Deutsche  2.6  0.1  3.3  2.8  2.6  3.8  1.7  1.2  0.6  0.8  19.5 
Fortis  0.0  4.5  2.7  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.0 
BNP  0.5  1.3  1.0  1.0  2.6  3.7  2.4  2.1  2.5  2.0  19.1 
ABN AMRO  0.0  1.9  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.9 
 
Source: WDCI, Bloomberg (numbers as of 31
st December, 2009) 
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 Table 6 – Leverage ratios for all banks in the data set (all numbers are from balance sheets) 
 
Leverage Ratios  Type of Bank 
2000-
2006 *  1Q07  2Q07  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09 
Total Debt / Shareholder Equity  Commercial  5.65  5.52  7.13  6.14  6.79  4.94  6.71  5.24  7.70  4.71  6.00  4.30  5.37 
  Investment  13.88  16.66  17.20  18.00  19.39  20.01  15.60  13.20  10.52  9.13  9.50  9.10  8.22 
  GSE  30.31  21.22  23.40  22.66  21.62  27.58  30.03  -379.04  -37.42  -70.72  -704.68  -352.85  -142.56 
Total Assets/ Common Equity**  Commercial  17.77  19.83  24.61  19.49  22.51  24.00  25.06  20.66  27.93  25.29  23.84  19.29  19.55 
  Investment  25.96  31.13  31.63  33.78  35.85  41.91  33.80  29.63  29.77  28.17  22.20  20.84  18.82 
  GSE  39.23  29.20  33.08  33.30  41.85  68.23  85.28  40.40  18.19  15.37  14.56  12.85  10.83 
Total Assets/ Shareholder Equity  Commercial  16.86  16.75  20.48  17.87  22.11  20.26  21.85  18.38  23.54  17.06  19.18  15.30  17.18 
  Investment  25.33  29.59  30.09  32.05  33.91  37.58  29.50  27.43  23.44  21.40  19.81  18.74  17.01 
  GSE  32.32  23.10  25.49  24.68  23.57  29.85  32.40  -398.83  -38.51  -74.85  -761.04  -385.79  -156.84 
Commercial Paper / Total Assets  Commercial  0.72%  1.62%  0.82%  1.92%  3.00%  1.76%  0.83%  1.71%  2.46%  1.70%  0.67%  0.91%  1.10% 
  Investment  0.57%  0.00%  0.18%  0.07%  2.88%  2.30%  0.00%  0.00%  3.22%  5.88%  3.19%  2.05%  3.88% 
    0.12%  0.44%  0.37%  1.13%  1.11%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Source: Balance Sheets of all banks, from Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports 
*2000-2006 numbers are average of the quarterly ratios from 2000 to 2006   




Source: Balance Sheets of all banks, from Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports 
Note: Commercial/Investment Bank Ratios are on the primary axis and GSE ratios on the secondary axis. 
(Debt = Short term borrowings + Long Term borrowings. It does not include Deposits held by a bank.) 
 




Source: Balance Sheets of all banks, from Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports 
Note: Commercial/Investment Bank Ratios are on the primary axis and GSE ratios on the secondary axis. 
   




































































































































































































Leverage ratios: Total Assets/Common Equity
Commercial Investment GSE 
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Source: Balance Sheets of all banks, from Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports 
Note: Commercial/Investment Bank Ratios are on the primary axis and GSE ratios on the secondary axis. 
 




 Source: Balance Sheets of all banks, from Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports 






















































































































FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
Commercial Paper/Total Assets
Commercial Investment GSETable 7 - Assets/ Common Equity for large U.S financial firms 
   
  1Q07  2Q07  3Q07  4Q07  1Q08  2Q08  3Q08  4Q08  1Q09  2Q09  3Q09  4Q09 
JP Morgan  11.97  12.23  12.33  12.68  13.08  13.96  16.35  16.12  15.04  13.82  13.24  12.93 
Wells Fargo  10.70  11.57  11.63  12.20  12.58  12.89  13.43  19.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Lehman  29.73  30.24  31.94  32.30  35.99  33.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Wachovia  9.69  9.94  10.27  10.05  10.74  11.89  17.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Citigroup  16.69  17.47  18.58  19.26  20.21  19.27  20.78  27.32  25.43  23.15  13.24  12.00 
Wamu  12.06  11.71  12.51  13.06  13.92  11.64  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Merrill  26.50  28.65  32.39  37.03  40.79  45.77  29.44  36.16  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Morgan Stanley  32.07  31.24  34.70  34.65  33.90  30.88  28.48  20.80  20.87  16.17  18.05  17.86 
Bank of America  11.38  11.55  11.69  12.05  12.49  12.39  13.38  13.05  13.96  11.47  11.32  11.45 
Goldman Sachs  20.59  21.40  23.28  23.84  25.18  23.97  23.46  17.85  19.23  15.66  14.86  13.12 
Fannie Mae  25.32  26.98  27.06  32.32  38.19  45.05  67.47  24.41  16.49  13.75  10.95  9.00 
Freddie Mac  34.62  43.28  44.07  62.10  392.09  853.44  27.92  14.29  14.41  15.50  15.64  13.70 
Bear Stearns  30.55  32.69  31.39  34.56  34.56  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Source: Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports  
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Figure 7 – Assets / Common Equity of US banks during the crisis
 



























4Q09Table 8 – Commercial Paper Worldwide 
 
Quarterly Data for Commercial Paper ($Bn) 
Year  CP  Year  CP  Year  CP  Year  CP 
1Q00  1449.1  1Q03  1349.9  1Q06  1709.9  1Q09  1488.8 
2Q00  1517.2  2Q03  1349.8  2Q06  1776.4  2Q09  1229.1 
3Q00  1560.2  3Q03  1321.4  3Q06  1886.0  3Q09  1279.5 
4Q00  1619.3  4Q03  1284.2  4Q06  1982.9  4Q09  1147.7 
1Q01  1523.0  1Q04  1323.5  1Q07  2034.7       
2Q01  1504.4  2Q04  1323.0  2Q07  2149.7       
3Q01  1457.0  3Q04  1341.2  3Q07  1871.8       
4Q01  1437.4  4Q04  1403.8  4Q07  1780.6       
1Q02  1400.2  1Q05  1436.9  1Q08  1821.5       
2Q02  1372.6  2Q05  1514.7  2Q08  1741.1       
3Q02  1360.8  3Q05  1597.2  3Q08  1624.3       
4Q02  1352.3  4Q05  1662.0  4Q08  1658.8       
Source: FCPOTOTS index – Bloomberg 
(Commercial Paper Outstanding Seasonally Adjusted) 
 




















Worldwide Commercial PaperTable 9 – Commercial Paper issued by each bank as reported in Cash Flow Statement of Financial Statements 
($ bn)  Name  Type of bank  FY00  FY01  FY02  FY03  FY04  FY05  FY06  FY07  FY08  FY09 
U.S  JP Morgan  Commercial  24.9  18.5  16.6  14.0  12.6  13.9  18.8  49.6  37.8  41.8 
U.S  Wells Fargo  Commercial  15.8  14.0  11.1  6.7  6.2  4.0  1.1  30.4  45.9  13.0 
U.S  Lehman Brothers  Investment  4.2  1.9  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.7  3.1  0.0  0.0 
U.S  Wachovia Corp.  Commercial  2.9  2.9  3.1  7.2  12.0  3.9  4.7  6.7  0.0  0.0 
U.S  Citigroup  Commercial  18.7  13.9  18.3  17.6  25.6  34.2  43.7  37.3  28.7  10.2 
U.S 
Washington 
Mutual  Commercial  1.0  0.4  0.7  1.1  4.0  7.1  4.8  2.0  0.0  0.0 
U.S  Merrill Lynch  Investment  13.0  1.9  3.4  3.4  4.0  3.9  6.4  12.9  20.1  0.0 
U.S  Morgan Stanley  Investment  27.8  32.8  50.8  28.4  28.5  23.2  22.4  22.6  6.7  0.8 
U.S  Bank of America  Commercial  7.0  1.6  25.2  42.5  78.6  116.3  141.3  191.1  158.1  0.0 
U.S  Goldman Sachs  Investment  10.7  8.4  9.5  4.8  4.4  5.2  1.5  4.3  1.1  62.5 
US  Fannie Mae  GSE  0.0  0.0  0.2  1.3  0.0  5.1  10.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
US  Freddie Mac  GSE  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  18.5  0.0  0.0 
US  Bear Stearns  Investment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  20.7  3.9  0.0  0.0 
U.K 
Royal Bank of 
Sctoland  Commercial  1.0  0.4  11.2  6.3  16.1  25.1  24.8  155.9  71.0  41.4 
U.K  HSBC  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
U.K  Barclays Plc.  Commercial  0.0  4.8  8.4  7.9  40.1  50.4  51.9  46.5  40.4  31.2 
U.K  HBOS  Commercial  2.0  11.2  15.0  23.0  0.0  0.0  33.9  33.5  129.9  0.0 
U.K  Lloyds TSB  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  15.4  18.6  25.6  34.5  42.2  56.6 
Europe  IKB  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Europe  UBS  Investment  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  69.7  77.8  98.0  133.6  104.1  49.9 
Europe  Credit Suisse  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.9  12.3  13.0  4.5  4.8 
Europe  Deutsche Bank  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.5  13.5  15.9  43.0  42.7  36.5  31.5 
Europe  Fortis Bank  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  60.4  78.5  100.4  109.2  0.0  0.0 
Europe  BNP Paribas  Commercial  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Europe  ABN AMRO  Commercial  26.0  20.3  25.1  20.3  20.9  61.5  74.4  63.3  41.9  30.3 
Total      154.8  132.8  200.1  202.5  413.8  553.9  741.4  1014.6  768.9  374.0 
Source: Bloomberg, SEC filings, Annual reports 
Note: Commercial paper information could not be found for HSBC, BNP, 2004 and 2005 numbers for HBOS, 2000 numbers for Barclays, 2000-2003 for Lloyds PLV, 
UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and Fortis and IKB in financial statements available on Bloomberg or SEC filings. 
* Data unavailable for this year  APPENDIX A. Variable Definitions 
 
Main Variables    Source 
Credit Losses & Writedowns  Writedowns include those that directly reduce income, as well as value reductions that only 
decrease equity and are excluded by the banks from their earnings figures. The values are net 
of financial hedges the companies use to mitigate losses. 
Bloomberg , WDCI 
function 
Capital Raised (WDCI)  Capital infused by all banks, brokers, insurance companies and GSEs by different means.   Bloomberg , WDCI 
function 
Capital Raised  Inlcudes net capital raised by long term  borrowings, net common equity issuance and net 




Net Capital  Inlcudes net capital raised by long term  borrowings, net common equity issuance and net 




Dividend  Dividends paid in cash by Banks  Bloomberg, SEC, annual 
reports, Datastream, 
Compustat 
Common Equity  Common  Equity w as  calculated b y  subtracting  Preferred E quity f rom T otal S hareHolders 
Equity. Both Preferred and ShareHolders Equity numbers were taken from the Balance Sheet 
Bloomberg, S EC, 
annual r eports, 
Datastream 
Profit & Loss  Profit & Loss of the bank  as reported on the Income Statement  Bloomberg, S EC, 
annual r eports, 
Datastream 
Assets  Total Assets of the bank as reported on the Balance Sheet  Bloomberg, SEC, annual 
reports, Datastream 
Liabilities  Total Liabilities of the bank as reported on the Balance Sheet  Bloomberg, S EC, 
annual r eports, 
Datastream 
Total Debt (Leverage ratios)  Short Term Borrowings + Long Term borrowings as reported on the Balance Sheet. This does 
not include deposits held by banks 
Bloomberg, S EC, 
annual r eports, 
Datastream 
Loans  Loans + Mortgages as reported on the Balance Sheet  Bloomberg, S EC, 




Appendix B. Frequency of data 
 
Banks  Frequency  No. of Years 
US Banks  Quarterly and Annual information  2000 onwards 
European Banks  Quarterly/Semi Annual and Annual information  2000 onwards 
UK Banks  Semi Annual and Annual information  2000 onwards 
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Bn  Qtr  Type of Bank 
Bank 
Region 
JP Morgan  50.7 
20-Oct-
09  USD  1 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
30 year 7% trust preferred 
security  1.0  3Q09  Commercial  U.S 
    1-Jun-09  USD  5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common  Common Stock  5.0  2Q09  Commercial  U.S 
   
28-Oct-
08  USD  25  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred  Preferred stock  25.0  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
JP Morgan   
26-Sep-
08  USD  10 
Public 
investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at $40.50 a 
share  10.0  3Q08  Commercial  U.S 
JP Morgan   
14-Aug-
08  USD  1.8 
Public 
investors  Public  Preferred  8.625% Perpetual securities  1.8  3Q08  Commercial  U.S 
JP Morgan   
29-Jun-
08  USD  0.07 
Migdal 
Insurance  Private  Other 
50% stake the capital 
markets unit of Migdal 
Insurance Holding Ltd  0.1  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
JP Morgan   
05-Jul-
08  USD  1.815 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
8.0% 40-Year fixed-to-
floating rate capital 
securities  1.8  3Q08  Commercial  U.S 
JP Morgan   
17-Apr-
08  USD  6 
Institutional 
Investors  Private  Preferred 
8.125% Perpetual preferred 
stock  6.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wells 
Fargo  50.4 
8-May-
09  USD  8.6 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common Shares at $22 
each  8.6  2Q09  Commercial  U.S 
   
06-Nov-




Investors  Public  Common 
Common shares at 
$27/share  11.0  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wells 
Fargo   
29-Oct-
08  USD  25  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred stock and 
warrants  25.0  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wells 
Fargo   
03-Sep-
08  USD  1.75 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
9.75% Perpetual hybrid 
bonds  1.8  3Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wells 
Fargo   
12-May-
08  USD  2.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
7.7% Fixed-to-float 
perpetual securities  2.5  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wells 
Fargo   
05-Mar-
08  USD  1.55 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.875% 60-Year trust 
preferred securities  1.6  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Lehman 
Brothers  13.9 
06-Sep-
08  USD  4 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at $28 a 
share  4.0  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Lehman   
06-Sep-
08  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.75% Non-cumulative 
mandatory convertible 
preferred stock  2.0  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Lehman   
05-Feb-
08  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
7.5% Subordinated 30-year 
bonds  2.0  1Q08  Investment  U.S 
Lehman   
04-Jan-
08  USD  4 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.25% Convertible 
preferred stock, 32% 
conversion premium  4.0  1Q08  Investment  U.S 
Lehman   
02-Feb-




Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.95% Perpetual preferred 
shares  1.9  1Q08  Investment  U.S 
IKB  10.7 
13-Feb-




Group  Govt.  Other  Details not known  2.9  1Q08  Commercial  Europe 
IKB   
27-Nov-
07  EUR  0.35 
German 
Banking 
Associations  SWF  Other  Details not known  0.4  4Q07  Commercial  Europe 
IKB   
27-Nov-
07  EUR  2.3  KfW Group  Private  Other  Details not known  2.9  4Q07  Commercial  Europe 
IKB   
02-Aug-
07  EUR  1 
German 
Banking 
Associations  Private  Other  Details not known  1.3  3Q07  Commercial  Europe 
IKB   
02-Aug-





Scotland  87.4 
3-Nov-
09  GBP  12.5  HM treasury  GOV  Common  
B Shares which constitute 
Core tier 1 capital ( 25.5 – 
13 billion recorded in 
February)  18.5  4Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
26-Feb-
09  GBP  13  HM treasury  GOV  Common  
B Shares which constitute 
Core tier 1 capital  19.2  1Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
19-Jan-
09  GBP  5 
HMT/Current 
shareholders  Private  Common 
Ordinary shares at 
31.75p/share  7.4  1Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
13-Jan-
09  GBP  0.74 
Public 
investors  Public  Other 
10.8bn shares of Bank of 
China Ltd  1.1  1Q09  Commercial  U.K 
RBS   
13-Oct-
08  GBP  15 
Public 
investors  Public  Common 
Common shares at 65.5 
pence each  22.2  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
RBS   
28-Jul-
08  GBP  0.5  Tesco Plc  Private  Other 
50% stake in Tesco 
Personal Finance Group 
Limit  0.7  3Q08  Commercial  U.K 
RBS   
22-Apr-
08  GBP  12.3 
Public 
Investors  Public  Other 
Rights offering (11 shares 
for 18)  18.2  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Wachovia 
Corp.  11.0 
14-Apr-
08  USD  4.025 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at $24 a 
share  4.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wachovia   
14-Apr-
08  USD  3.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.5% Preferred convertible 
stock  3.5  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wachovia   
02-Jun-
08  USD  3.5 
80 Domestic 
Investors 
(Unidentified)  Private  Preferred 
7.98% preferred stock, 
private placement  3.5  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup  138.54 
10-Mar-
10  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.5% Trust Preferred 
Securities  2.0  1Q09  Commercial  U.S 
   
16-Jan-
09  USD  10  FDIC  Govt.  Other 
capital benefit from asset 
guarantee  10.0  1Q09  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
16-Jan-
09  USD  5  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Other 
capital benefit from asset 
guarantee  5.0  1Q09  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
31-Dec-
08  USD  20  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred  Preferred shares  20.0  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
16-Dec-
08  JPY  25 
Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial 
Group  Private  Other 
Sale in NikkoCiti Trust and 
Banking corp.  27.6  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
28-Oct-
08  USD  25  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred shares and 
warrants  25.0  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
11-Jul-
08  USD  4 
Credit Mutual 
Group  Private  Other 
German consumer unit 
(after-tax profit from the 
asset's sale)  4.0  3Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
12-May-
08  EUR  0.578  ING Group  Private  Other 
CitiStreet (exact profit from 
the asset's sale not given)  0.7  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
05-Jun-
08  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.5% Perpetual preferred 
stock  2.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
29-Apr-
08  USD  4.9 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at $25.27 a 
share  4.9  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
21-Apr-
08  USD  6 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.4% Perpetual preferred 
stock  6.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
14-Apr-
08  USD  0.165 
Discover 
Financial  Private  Other  Diners Club  0.2  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
15-Jan-




Authority  SWF  Preferred 
7.0% Convertible preferred 
stock  6.9  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
15-Jan-
08  USD  5.62 
Kuwait 
Investment 
Authority  Govt.  Preferred 
7.0% Convertible preferred 
stock  5.6  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
15-Jan-
08  USD  3.187 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
6.5% Convertible preferred 
stock, 35% conversion 
premium  3.2  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
15-Jan-
08  USD  3.715 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred  8.125%  preferred stock  3.7  1Q08  Commercial  U.S  
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Citigroup   
21-Dec-
07  USD  3.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.3% enhance E trust 
preferred securities  3.5  4Q07  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
27-Nov-




Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.875% enhance E trust 
preferred securities  0.8  4Q07  Commercial  U.S 
Citigroup   
27-Nov-
07  USD  7.5 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment 
Authority  SWF  Debt 
11% Equity units 
convertible to common 
stock  7.5  4Q07  Commercial  U.S 
Washingto
n Mutual  12.1 
31-Mar-
08  USD  2  TPG Inc.  Private  Preferred 
Common shares & 
preferred stock  2.0  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wamu   
31-Mar-
08  USD  6.05 
Institutional 
Investors  Private  Preferred 
Common shares & 
preferred stock  6.1  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Wamu   
12-Nov-
07  USD  3 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.75% Perpetual 
convertible preferred shares  3.0  4Q07  Commercial  U.S 
Wamu   
18-Oct-
07  USD  1 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
9.75% Perpetual preferred 
hybrid bonds  1.0  4Q07  Commercial  U.S 
Merrill 
Lynch  29.9 
28-Jul-
08  USD  6.4 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at $22.50 a 
share  6.4  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
28-Jul-
08  USD  0.9 
Temasek 
Holdings  SWF  Common 
Common stock at $22.50 a 
share  0.9  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
17-Jul-
08  USD  4.425  Bloomberg LP  Private  Other 
20% stake in Bloomberg 
(pre-tax profit from the 
asset's sale)  4.4  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
05-Jul-
08  USD  1.75  Public Investor  Public  Debt 
Unsecured subordinated 30-
year bonds  1.8  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
22-Apr-
08  USD  2.55 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.625% Perpetual preferred 
stock  2.6  2Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
24-Feb-
08  USD  0.6 
Temasek 
Holdings Pte.  SWF  Common 
Common stock at $48 per 
share  0.6  1Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
15-Jan-




Authority  SWF  Preferred  9% preferred stock  6.6  1Q08  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
31-Dec-
07  USD  0.316  Aegon N.V  Private  Other 
Merrill Lynch Life 
Insurance Company and 
ML Life Insurance 
Company of New York 
(after-tax profit from asset's 
sale)  0.3  4Q07  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
24-Dec-
07  USD  4.4 
Temasek 
Holdings Pte.  SWF  Common 
Common stock at 14% 
discount  4.4  4Q07  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
24-Dec-
07  USD  1.2 
Davis Selected 
Advisors LP  Private  Common 
Common stock at $48 per 
share  1.2  4Q07  Investment  U.S 
Merrill   
13-Aug-
07  USD  0.75  Public Investor  Public  Preferred  7.375% preferred stock  0.8  3Q07  Investment  U.S 
Morgan 
Stanley  28.779  2-Jun-09  USD  2.2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Com 
Common Shares at $27.44 
each.  2.2  2Q09  Investment  U.S 
   
8-May-
09  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Com 
Common Shares at $24 
each  2.0  2Q09  Investment  U.S 
   
26-Oct-
08  USD  10  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred  Preferred stock  10.0  4Q08  Investment  U.S 
Morgan 
Stanley   
14-Oct-
08  USD  1.2 
Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial 
Group  Private  Preferred 
10% Non-convertible 
preferred shares  1.2  4Q08  Investment  U.S 
Morgan 
Stanley   
14-Oct-
08  USD  7.8 
Mitsubishi 
UFJ Financial 
Group  Private  Preferred 
Preferred shares convertible 




Stanley   
19-Dec-
07  USD  5.579 
China 
Investment 
Corp.  SWF  Debt 
9.0% Units convertible to 
common stock in Aug. 
2010  5.6  4Q07  Investment  U.S 
UBS  34.4 
26-Jun-
09  CHF  3.8 
Public 
Investors  Pub  Other 
Common Shares at 13 
francs each  3.19  2Q09  Investment  Europe 
   
31-Dec-
08  USD  0.4  Public investor  Public  Other  3.4 billion H-Shares  0.4  4Q08  Investment  Europe 
UBS   
16-Oct-
08  CHF  6 
Switzerland 
Govt  Govt.  Debt 
12.5% mandatory 
convertible notes  5.0  4Q08  Investment  Europe 
UBS   
13-Jun-
08  CHF  15.97 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at 21 francs 
a share  13.4  2Q08  Investment  Europe 
UBS   
24-May-
08  USD  0.156  Shareholders  Public  Other 
24.9% stake in Adam Street 
Partners LLC (exact profit 
from asset sales not given)  0.2  2Q08  Investment  Europe 
UBS   
04-Mar-
08  EUR  1 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
8.836% Perpetual fix-to-
float bonds  1.3  1Q08  Investment  Europe 
UBS   
12-Oct-




Corp.  SWF  Debt 
9.0% 2-Year bonds 
convertible to stock  9.2  4Q07  Investment  Europe 
UBS   
12-Oct-
07  CHF  2 
Unidentified 
Mideast 
investor  Private  Debt 
9.0% 2-Year bonds 
convertible to stock  1.7  4Q07  Investment  Europe 
HSBC  26.15  3-Jun-09  EUR  1.75 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
Subordinated Bonds ( 245 
Basis more than benchmark 
mid-swap rate)  2.2  2Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
2-Mar-
09  GBP  12.85 
Public 
Investors  Public 
Common 
Stock  Rights Offer  19.0  1Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
03-Sep-
08  GBP  0.65 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt 
6.75% subordinated 20-yr 
bonds  1.0  3Q08  Commercial  U.K 
HSBC   
17-Jun-
08  USD  0.439 
Global 
Payments Inc.  Private  Other 
51% stake in HSBC 
Merchant Services (exact 
profit from asset's sale not 
given)  0.4  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
HSBC   
19-May-
08  USD  1.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
6.8% Subordinated 30-year 
bonds  1.5  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
HSBC   
02-Apr-
08  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
8.125% Perpetual capital 
securities  2.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America  99.3 
20-May-
09  USD  13.5 
Public 
Investors  Public 
Common 
Stock 
Common Shares at $10.77 
each  13.5  2Q09  Commercial  U.S 
   
12-May-
09  USD  7.3 
Public 
Investors  Public  Other 
5.8% of its stake in China 
Construction Bank at 
HK$4.2 each (exact profit 
not given)  7.3  2Q09  Commercial  U.S 
   
16-Jan-
09  USD  20  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred shares and 
warrants  20.0  1Q09  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
09-Jan-
09  USD  10  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred shares and 




America   
07-Jan-
09  USD  2.8 
Public 
Investors  Public  Other 
13% stake in China 
Construction Bank  2.8  1Q09  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
26-Oct-
08  USD  15  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred shares and 
warrants  15.0  4Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
10-Jul-
08  USD  10 
Puiblic 
Investors  Public  Common  Common stock at $22 each  10.0  3Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
20-May-
08  USD  2.7 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.2% Perpetual preferred 
shares  2.7  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
24-Apr-
08  USD  4 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.125% Perpetual hybrid 
bonds  4.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
24-Jan-
08  USD  13 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.0% and 7.25% Preferred 
stock and convertibl  13.0  1Q08  Commercial  U.S 
Bank of 
America   
14-Nov-
07  USD  1.035 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.25% Perpetual preferred 
shares  1.0  4Q07  Commercial  U.S 
Barclays 
Plc.  85.4  8-Jul-09  JPY  52.7 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt  Samurai Bonds  58.08  3Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
19-Nov-
08  GBP  0.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
14% preferred shares and 
warrants convertible at 
197.775p per share  0.7  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
31-Oct-




HH Sheikh   Private  Preferred 
Mandatory convertible 
notes (9.75% until 
conversion at153.6276p on 
30/06/09)  6.4  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
31-Oct-
08  GBP  2.5  Qatar Holding  Private  Preferred 
14% preferred shares and 
warrants convertible at 
197.775p per share  3.7  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
18-Sep-
08  GBP  0.701 
Public 
investors  Public  Common 
Common shares at 301p per 
share  1.0  3Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
05-Aug-
08  GBP  0.33 
Swiss 
Reinsurance 
Co.  Private  Other 
U.K. life-insurance unit 
(after-tax profit from asset's 
sale)  0.5  3Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
25-Jun-




Group Inc.  Private  Common 
Common stock at 296 
pence a share  0.7  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
25-Jun-
08  GBP  0.753 
Public 
investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at 282 
pence a share  1.1  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
25-Jun-











Development  SWF  Common 
Common stock at 282 
pence a share  4.8  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
18-Apr-
08  USD  2 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt  7.7% perpetual securities  2.0  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
08-Apr-
08  USD  2.65 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt  8.125% perpetual securities  2.7  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
25-Jul-
07  GBP  1 
Temasek 
Holdings Pte  SWF  Common 
Common stock at 740 
pence a share  1.5  3Q07  Commercial  U.K 
Barclays   
25-Jul-
07  GBP  1.5 
China 
Development 
Bank  SWF  Common 
Common stock at 740 
pence a share  2.2  3Q07  Commercial  U.K 
Credit 
Suisse  11.4 
16-Oct-
08  CHF  10 
Public 




Suisse   
21-Aug-
08  USD  0.3 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt 
8.25% Perpetual non-
cumulative bonds  0.3  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Credit 
Suisse   
13-Jun-
08  USD  1.2 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt 
8.25% Perpetual non-
cumulative bonds  1.2  2Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Credit 
Suisse   
25-Mar-
08  USD  1.525 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt 
7.90% Perpetual capital 
securities  1.5  1Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Deutsche 
Bank  9.59 
25-Aug-
09  EUR  3 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt  9.5% subordinated bonds  3.8  3Q09  Commercial  Europe 
   
22-Sep-
08  EUR  2 
Institutional 
investors  Private  Common 
Common shares at 55 euros 
each  2.5  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Deutsche   
01-May-
08  USD  1.265 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.05% Perpetual preferred 
trust securities (cumulative 
with option of being non-
cumulative)  1.3  2Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Deutsche   
12-Feb-
08  USD  1.975 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
7.6% Perpetual preferred 
stock  2.0  1Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Goldman 
Sachs  41.09  1-Jun-09  HKD  14.86 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common  Hong Kong Traded shares  14.9  2Q09  Investment  U.S 
   
14-Apr-
09  HKD  5.75 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common  Common STock  5.8  2Q09  Investment  U.S 
   
28-Oct-
08  USD  10  U.S. Treasury  Govt.  Preferred  Preferred stock and warants  10.0  4Q08  Investment  U.S 
Goldman 
Sachs   
24-Sep-
08  USD  5 
Public 
investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at $123 a 
share  5.0  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Goldman 
Sachs   
24-Sep-
08  USD  5 
Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc.  Private  Preferred 
10% Perpetual preferred 
stock  5.0  3Q08  Investment  U.S 
Goldman 
Sachs   
01-Oct-
08  GBP  0.325 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt  6.875% Subordinated bonds  0.5  4Q08  Investment  U.S 
Fannie 
Mae  83.60 
10-May-
10  USD  8.4 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  8.40  3Q09  GSE  US 
   
26-Feb-
10  USD  15.3 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  15.30  1Q10  GSE  US 
   
5-Nov-
09  USD  15 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  15.00  4Q09  GSE  US 
   
6-Aug-
09  USD  10.7 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  10.70  3Q09  GSE  US 
   
6-May-
09  USD  19 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  19.00  2Q09  GSE  US 
   
25-Feb-
09  USD  15.2 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  15.20  1Q09  GSE  US 
Freddie 
Mac  57.70 
12-May-
09  USD  6.1 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  6.10  2Q09  GSE  US 
   
11-Mar-
09  USD  30.8 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  30.80  1Q09  GSE  US  
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24-Nov-
08  USD  13.8 
US 
Government.  Govt.  Preferred 
Preferred Shares entered 
into under Purchase 
Agreement  13.80  4Q08  GSE  US 
   
4-Dec-
07  USD  6 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
8.375% Variable preferred 
shares  6.00  4Q07  GSE  US 
   
28-Sep-
07  USD  0.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
6.55% Fixed Perpetual 
Preferred Shares   0.50  3Q07  GSE  US 
   
24-Jul-
07  USD  0.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
6.02% Fixed perpetual 
Preferred Shares  0.50  3Q07  GSE  US 
Fortis 
Bank  20.4 
29-Sep-
08  EUR  2.5 
Luxembourg 
Government  Govt.  Debt 
Loan convertible into 49% 
stake in Luxembourg 
banking division  3.2  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Fortis   
29-Sep-
08  EUR  4.7 
Belgium 
Government  Govt.  Other 
49% stake in Belgian 
banking unit  6.0  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Fortis   
29-Sep-
08  EUR  4 
Netherlands 
Government  Govt.  Other  Stake in Dutch business  5.1  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Fortis   
02-Jul-
08  EUR  0.709  Deutsche Bank  Govt.  Other 
Commercial lending units 
in Netherlands (exact prfoit 
from asset sale not given)  0.9  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Fortis   
26-Jun-
08  EUR  1.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock at 10 euros 
a share  1.9  2Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Fortis   
26-Jun-
08  EUR  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
Preferred stock - no other 
details given in initial 
announcement  2.5  2Q08  Commercial  Europe 
Fortis   
23-May-
08  EUR  0.625 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt  8% subordinated bonds  0.8  2Q08  Commercial  Europe 
HBOS  22.9 
15-Jan-
09 
  GBP  3 
Public 
Investors  Public  Preferred 
Preference shares (12% for 
first five years and 3month 
Libor +700bps thereafter  4.4  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
HBOS   
13-Oct-
08  GBP  8.5 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common shares at 113.6 
pence each  12.6  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
HBOS   
21-Jul-





Ltd., and o  Private  Common 
Common stock, two new 
shares for every five at 
275pence per share  3.7  3Q08  Commercial  U.K 
HBOS   
21-Jul-
08  GBP  1.52 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Common stock, two new 
shares for every five at 
275pence per share  2.2  3Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Lloyds 
TSB  47.6 
16-Dec-
09  USD  2 
Public 
Investors  Public  Other 
12% hybrid Tier 1 
securities  2.00  4Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
3-Nov-
09  GBP  7.7 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
13.5 billion rights offering 
(37p) net of UK Govt 
Portion  11.40  4Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
3-Nov-
09  GBP  5.8  HM Treasury  Govt.  Common 
43% share of 13.5 billion 
rights offering  8.58  4Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
3-Nov-
09  GBP  7.5 
Public 
Investors  Govt.  Other 
Core Tier 1 capital 
generated by Exchange 
Offers  11.10  4Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
13-Jan-
09  GBP  1  HM Treasury  Public  Preferred  12% Preference shares  1.48  1Q09  Commercial  U.K 
   
17-Oct-
08  GBP  0.4 
Public 




TSB   
13-Oct-
08  GBP  4.5 
Public 
investors  Public  Common 
Common shares at 173.3 
pence each  6.7  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Lloyds 
TSB   
13-Oct-
08  GBP  1 
Public 
investors  Public  Preferred  12% Preference shares  1.5  4Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Lloyds 
TSB   
29-May-
08  GBP  0.75 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt 
Variable subordinated 
callable bonds  1.1  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Lloyds 
TSB   
15-May-
08  EUR  0.5 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt  7.875% Perpetual bonds  0.6  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Lloyds 
TSB   
15-May-
08  USD  1.25 
Public 
investors  Public  Debt  7.875 Perpetual bonds  1.3  2Q08  Commercial  U.K 
Lloyds 
TSB   
26-Feb-
08  EUR  1 
Public 
Investors  Public  Debt 
Variable subordinated  
bonds  1.3  1Q08  Commercial  U.K 
BNP 
Paribas  11.938 
29-Sep-
09  EUR  4.3 
Public 
Investors  Public  Common 
Rights Offering at 40 Euros 
each  5.5  3Q09  Commercial  Europe 
   
20-Mar-
09  EUR  2.55 
French 
Government  Govt  Debt 
Subordinated Bonds 
(Second Tranche)  3.2  1Q09  Commercial  Europe 
   
18-Aug-
08  EUR  2.55  French Govt  Govt.  Debt  Subordinated Bonds  3.2  3Q08  Commercial  Europe 
 